We investigate the impact of the banking reform started from 2005 on ownership structures in China on commercial banks' profitability, efficiency and risk over the period 2000-2012, providing comprehensive evidence on the impact of banking reform in China. We find that banks on average tend to have higher profitability, lower risk and lower efficiency after the reforms, and the results are robust with our difference-in-difference approach. Our results also show that the Big 5 state-owned banks underperform banks with other types of ownership when risk is measured by non-performing loans (NPLs) over the entire study period, but tend to have fewer NPLs than other banks during the post-reform period. Our results provide some supporting evidence on the ongoing banking reforms in China, suggesting that attracting strategic foreign investors and listing state-owned banks on stock exchanges appear to be effective ways to help state-owned banks deal with the problem of NPLs and manage their risk.
Introduction
The Chinese economy has global significance, and the banking system in China plays a crucial role in maintaining a healthy economy. Since 1978, the Chinese banking sector has undergone significant reforms to transform the sector into a modern banking system based on market and profitability functions (García-Herrero, Gavilá, and Santabárbara 2009). The process of reform has been accelerated after China joined the WTO at the end of 2001.
Differing from banking reforms in transition economies in Central and Eastern
Europe, where new banking systems were created, Chinese banking reform tends to be more gradual (Jiang, Yao, and Feng 2013) . Because the banking reform in China appears to have tremendous success in risk management and performance and efficiency improvement (e.g., Wang et al. 2014; Allen et al. 2014) , experiences and lessons from China will be of particular interest to other transition economies (Jiang, Yao, and Feng 2013) .
A number of studies have examined how Chinese banks' performance has responded to banking reforms. However, most of them used data prior to the great financial crisis of 2007. Since 2005, remarkable changes of ownership structure (e.g., encouraging foreign investments and public listing) have been seen in major Chinese banks, but little is known about the impact of such reform. Although a few studies have investigated how Chinese banks performed after 2005, they tend to focus on large, either state-owned or joint-stock commercial banks (e.g., Allen et al. 2014; Wang et al. 2014 ). This paper attempts to address the changes in the performance and risk levels of different types of Chinese banks over the period of 2000-2012, with particular interest in the year of 2005 when radical reform measures were adopted. It contributes to the literature in several ways.
First, previous studies of banking reforms focus mainly on the profitability and/or efficiency of Chinese banks (e.g., Heffernan and Fu 2010; Deng, Guo, and Kong 2011; Jiang, Yao, and Feng 2013) , and lack evidence of their levels of risk-taking. One of the most significant problems for the Chinese banking sector is the state-owned banks' level of nonperforming loans (NPLs), which has been largely overlooked until very recently (Allen et al. 2014; Jiang, Yao, and Feng 2013) . This paper addresses this under-researched area and assesses Chinese banks' risk-taking by using the measures of NPLs and Z-score. Second, our study provides comprehensive and up-to-date evidence on the impacts of banking reforms in China. It uses a bigger sample of more Chinese commercial banks than previous empirical studies, and also takes into consideration the effect of the 2007-09 financial crisis to which little attention has been paid. This study, therefore, enriches our Third, we provide further evidence on bank ownership reform. Our results show that the Big 5 state-owned banks outperform banks with joint-stock ownership and city commercial banks in terms of overall risk as measured by Z-score, but underperform them over the entire study period when risk is measured by the NPLs. However, employing the difference-in-difference approach (DiD), we find that the Big 5 have lower NPLs than other banks during the post-reform period. This suggests that the "Chinese model" (Allen et al. 2014 ) of banking reforms, which attracts strategic foreign investors and lists state-owned banks on stock exchanges yet keeps control ultimately in the hands of the government, appears to be an effective way of helping state-owned banks deal with the problem of NPLs. (Luo et al. 2015) .
The Chinese government encouraged the privatization of SOCBs not only by attracting foreign institutional investors as minority shareholders but also by listing them on stock exchanges. The Bank of Communications (BOCOM) 3 was the first to take this route, issuing an IPO in Hong Kong in June 2005 (Berger, Hasan, and Zhou 2009 
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Reform and bank performance
One of the main objectives of banking reform in both developed and developing countries is to improve the efficiency and profitability of banks (Berger and Humphrey 1997) .
Privatization of banks is expected to enhance the level of competition in the banking sector and in turn improve overall performance (Clarke, Cull, and Shirley 2005) . Literature on whether banking reforms can achieve these initiatives has not, however, reached agreement.
Early research in the US reveals unchanged or even decreased bank efficiency post-reform (e.g., Berger and Mester 1997) , and similar results are found by several cross-county studies (e.g., Boubakri et al. 2005 ).
On the other hand, Brissimis, Delis, and Papanikolaou (2008) find a positive impact of banking reform on efficiency in newly acceded EU countries from 1994 to 2005. Improved cost efficiency brought about by banking reforms has also been reported in other countries, such as Australia (Sturm and Williams 2004) . These results are consistent with the belief that banking reforms should be able to help banks achieve efficiency gains. In a less competitive market, banks are likely to behave inefficiently, as they can avoid minimizing cost without being forced out of the market (Fu and Heffernan 2009). Privatization and foreign bank penetration increase the level of competition in the banking sector and therefore encourage banks to operate more efficiently. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) examine the effects of the entry of foreign banks into different countries, and find that in most cases foreign entry forces domestic banks to improve their efficiency.
Evidence on whether banking reform can improve profitability of banks is also ambiguous. Humphrey and Pulley (1997) find that deregulation of interest rates reduced profitability of US banks, while Boubakri et al. (2005) show that profitability of banks increases during post-privatisation period in 22 developing countries. Chronopoulos, Liu, McMillan, and Wilson (2015) examine how key regulatory events in the US affect the profitability of banks over the period 1984-2010. The authors find that adoption of the Riegle-Neal IBBEA Act that eliminated federal restrictions on interstate banking resulted in reduced profits persistence and bank profit levels, while the introduction of GLB Act which allowed banks to diversify across business segments increased profits persistence and profit levels.
Bank performance during the reform process appears to differ depending on its ownership structure. State-owned banks are found to underperform private banks in many countries (e.g., Cornett et al. 2010; Weintraub and Nakane 2005) . Foreign-owned banks tend to outperform domestically owned banks in general, as they have the advantages of serving multinational customers, access to capital and use of technology (Berger 2007) . However, contradictory evidence is provided by Naaborg and Lensink (2008) , who find a negative relationship between foreign ownership and bank profitability in a cross-section study in
Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
Whether the banking reforms in China have been an effective way to improve the performance of Chinese commercial banks remains doubtful, as empirical evidence tends to be limited and the impact of recent reforms is unclear (Berger, Hasan, and Zhou 2009, Luo and Yao 2010) . Berger, Hasan, and Zhou (2009) Li, and Wang (2013) show that the financial performance of the Big 4 is not inferior to other banks. Wang et al.'s (2014) findings suggest that SOCBs appear to be overall more efficient than JSCBs, but such an efficiency difference is only seen in the pre-reform period, and is reduced over the postreform period.
Reform and bank risk
The traditional structure-conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis predicts that higher levels of market concentration are likely to lead to an increase in the market power of banks, which allows them to enjoy higher loan rates and lower deposit rates (Fu and Heffernan 2009). A more competitive banking sector resulting from privatization could result in a decline of bank chart value, which encourages bankers to take excessive risks and in turn increases banks' default risk (Keeley 1990) . Moreover, private shareholders are likely to engage in higher risk activities so as to maximize the value of the option/share (Boubakri et al. 2005) , and to lend recklessly, as they will not bear the entire loss if the bank becomes insolvent (Clarke, Cull, and Shirley 2005) . The entry of foreign ownership will further enhance competition in the banking sector and increase banks' risk. The positive relationship between foreign ownership and bank risk-taking has been confirmed by some empirical studies (e.g., Lee and Hsieh 2014).
Nevertheless, privatization is also likely to change banks' risk-taking behaviour in a favourable way, as new shareholders will be better at monitoring the management of risktaking (Boubakri et al. 2005) . State-owned banks are argued to be associated with high risk due to political interference (Clarke, Cull, and Shirley 2005; , and the privatization of state-owned banks is likely to limit harmful government interference and improve the quality of lending through improved screening (Clarke, Cull, and Shirley 2005) .
Some empirical evidence shows that state-owned banks tend to have higher default risk than privately owned banks (e.g., Berger et al. 2005; Cornett et al. 2010) . Moreover, foreign banks may have a positive influence on the stability of emerging market banking systems, as the entry of foreign investors is accompanied by advanced knowledge, skills and technology, and therefore contributes to an improved control and risk management environment in the domestic banking sector (Crystal, Dages, and Goldberg 2001) .
Extant literature on the effect of Chinese banking reforms mainly focuses on performance measures such as efficiency and profitability. Very few studies have investigated the impact of ownership structure on Chinese banks' risk-taking behaviour during the reform process (e.g., Allen et al. 2014; Jia 2009) , and their findings are contradictory. find that government-controlled banks tend to take more risks than other types of banks due to political intervention and weak risk management practice. Allen et al. (2014) , on the other hand, argue that the government can impose non-profit goals via the state-owned banks, such as systemic stability of the financial system, and ensure continued lending in an adverse economic environment. This appears to be of importance to the overall risk control of Chinese banking system. The authors suggest that the privatization of Chinese state-owned banks via listing on stock exchanges has been successful in improving their performance and risk management.
As can be seen from the above discussion, empirical evidence on the impact of banking reforms in China is insufficient and inconclusive. Moreover, with the exception of Allen et al. (2014) , there is a lack of research on the changes in bank performance and risk during and after the global financial crisis. We intend to add more evidence to this under- financial crisis. This paper, therefore, is intended to extend knowledge of banking reforms in developing economies by providing comprehensive and up-to-date evidence.
Methodology
Data
The data used in this study is mainly collected from the BankScope database. It covers the period of 2000 to 2012, with more than 1,200 observations for a sample of 184 Chinese commercial banks. It includes data for 94 banks during the pre-regulation period (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) and for 172 banks during the period of 2006 to 2012.
Model
We apply OLS regressions with clustered standard errors at the bank level to examine the impact of banking reforms in 2005 on Chinese banks' profitability, efficiency and risk-taking, comparing banks with different types of ownership structure. Six bank ownership indicators are used to differentiate Chinese banks, namely, the Big 5, joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs), city commercial banks (CCBs), rural commercial banks (RCBs), foreign banks and banks with minority foreign ownership. We also introduce a dummy variable to examine whether listing on stock exchanges impacts bank performance and risk. Furthermore, variables of bank-specific characteristics and macroeconomics are included in the models since they are shown to be the determinants of bank performance and stability by previous studies. The basic regression model is specified as below:
Bank performance/risk measure = Constant + 1 * banking reform dummy Detailed definitions of the variables used in the model are shown in Table 1 .
[Insert Table 1 Here]
Bank performance measure
Bank efficiency is normally measured by the distance of the financial institutions from a bestpractice frontier (Berger and Humphrey 1997; Brissimis, Delis, and Papanikolaou 2008) , using various parametric or non-parametric approaches. 6 One of the most widely used nonparametric methods is data envelopment analysis (DEA), which is based on a linear programming input-output technique and yields a convex production possibility set (Berger and Humphrey 1997; Brissimis, Delis, and Papanikolaou 2008) . The advantage of DEA approach is that it does not require the explicit specification of the functional form of the production frontier (Berger and Humphrey 1997) . In view of the characteristics of the dataset such as the relatively small number of Chinese banks, the DEA approach is employed in our study to estimate the efficiency score of Chinese banks. It is calculated by three inputs (customer deposits and short-term funding, total costs, and equity capital, to adequately account for the impact of risk) and three outputs (loans, other earning assets, and non-interest incomes).
We use two measures of bank risk: the ratio of impaired loans to total assets and Zscore. Z-score has been widely used in empirical literature to measure overall bank risk (e.g., Berger, Hasan, and Zhou 2009; Liu and Wilson 2013; Soedarmono, Machrouh, and Tarazi 2013) ; it reflects the extent to which banks have enough capital to absorb losses (Liu, Molyneux, and Wilson 2013). The higher the Z-score value, the lower a bank's risk and the greater its stability. In order to capture the dynamics of bank risk, we follow the work of Liu and Wilson (2013), using a three-year rolling window to calculate the standard deviation of return on assets. Because the Z-score is highly skewed (Laeven and Levine 2009 , Liu et al. 2013 , the natural logarithm of it is used in our models. We also employ the ratio of impaired loans to total assets to measure non-performing loans (NPLs).
The NPLs problem is a crucial issue in Chinese banking sector, but has been overlooked by existing studies (Jiang, Yao, and Feng 2013) . During the reform process, the Chinese government has taken several steps to help SOCBs clean up deteriorated balance sheets. It would be of interest to see whether the banking reforms have lowered the level of NPLs in China.
Return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) are commonly used to measure bank profitability. As ROE disregards the greater risks associated with high leverage (low equity), which is determined to some extent by regulation (Athanasoglou, Brissimis, and Delis 2005) , ROA is used to measure the profitability of banks in this study. Figure 1 shows the trend of bank performance over the sample period.
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
We also employ a difference-in-difference approach (DiD) (Meyer 1995; Angrist and Krueger 1999) , which is widely used in applied economics to estimate the effect of policy intervention (Athey and Imbens 2006) . DiD estimation identifies a specific intervention or treatment, and then compares the difference in outcomes before and after the intervention for groups affected by the intervention with the corresponding difference for unaffected groups (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004) . It has the potential to circumvent many of the endogeneity problems that typically arise when making comparisons between heterogeneous individuals (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004; Meyer 1995) . We use the year 2005 as the intervention and the Big 5 as the affected group, because some radical reform measures adopted in 2005 mainly applied to the privatization of SOCBs (see discussion in Section 2).
Other control variables
We consider a range of bank-specific characteristics that are likely to affect bank performance and risk, including market power of banks, bank size, cost ratio, diversification and liquidity.
The previous literature has shown that competition can affect banks' risk-taking, although the sign of the relationship is not agreed upon. One school of thought, which is wellknown as "competition-fragility", argues that an increase in competition encourages excessive risk-taking and a reduction in capital, thereby increasing the risk of bank failure (Keeley 1990) . On the other hand, the "competition-stability" view argues that declined competition induces banks to offer loans at high rates and therefore increases the bankruptcy risk for bank borrowers, which in turn increases the risk of banks through risk-shifting mechanisms in the overall market (Soedarmono, Machrouh, and Tarazi 2013) . Studies such as Boyd, De Nicoló, and Jalal (2006) and Soedarmono, Machrouh, and Tarazi (2013) sector during the financial crisis was largely due to the government's involvement of setting strict restrictions on financial institutions from avoiding inferior investments and cutting interest rates so as to encourage banks to expand lending. Allen et al. (2014) suggest that government ownership of Chinese banks enabled better enforcement of some non-profit goals (e.g., systemic stability and continued lending activity) in state-owned banks than in private banks during the recession and crisis period.
Summary statistics and correlation
The summary statistics for the dependent and independent variables for all sample banks and univariate tests of differences between pre-regulation and post-regulation periods are shown in Table 2 .
[Insert Table 2 Here]
The table shows that there were 94 banks in China during the pre-reform period We also observe that the mean values of both cost-to-income ratio and liquidity decrease after 2005, suggesting that Chinese banks in general have improved operational efficiency but lowered their level of liquidity during the post-reform period. Table 3 reports the correlation matrix among all variables.
[Insert Table 3 Here]
Empirical results
Main results
We first examine the impact of the 2005 banking reforms on bank performance measures by comparing the Big 5 with non-Big 5 banks. 7 Dummy variables for banks with foreign minority ownership and listing on stock exchanges are also included in the regression model to assess whether the strategy of encouraging foreign investments and public listing significantly affected bank performance. Table 4 provides the baseline regression results.
[Insert Table 4 Regarding ownership structure, it is noteworthy that banks with foreign minority ownership became more efficient and less risky than other banks. This is consistent with Berger, Hasan, and Zhou (2009) , who argue that minority foreign ownership may increase
Chinese bank efficiency through improving corporate governance, technological advancement and risk management. We also find that public listing is associated with higher profitability, greater equity level and lower risk as measured by Z-score, supporting the argument that listing on stock exchanges can substantially reduce the adverse effects of government ownership (Allen et al. 2014 ).
We then conduct bank performance analysis prior to and after 2005 by comparing joint-stock, foreign, city and rural banks with the Big 5. Table 5 presents the results of the analysis.
[Insert Table 5 Here] 2001, which is much higher than in other large economies (Allen et al. 2014) . Although steps have been taken to reduce the level of non-performing loans in state-owned banks (e.g., the establishment of AMCs in 1999), the Big 5 tend to behave less prudently in lending due to political intervention and low levels of accountability. The problem is more pronounced in rural commercial banks, as government intervention tends to be even stronger in rural China.
Therefore, it is not surprising that rural commercial banks perform the worst in the abovementioned risk measure compared with other banks.
However, the Big 5 tend to outperform joint-stock and city commercial banks in their overall risk level as measured by Z-score, suggesting that the Big 5 have more capital to absorb losses compared with joint-stock and city commercial banks. This can also be seen from the coefficient on the variable of equity to total asset. capacity to earn more in the market and therefore resulted in higher levels of profitability (Khan et al. 2011) . This is confirmed by the positive relationship between the 2007-09 financial crisis dummy and the ROA in both models.
With regard to control variables, one notable observation is the impact of competition on bank performance and stability. We observe that, in both the two models, the Lerner index has a significant negative impact on NPLs and significant positive impacts on Z-score, ROA and the efficiency measure. This suggests that the more market power a bank has, the more profitable, more efficient and less risky it is. These results support the "competition-fragility" view, and also provide evidence on the relation between competition and efficiency in the Chinese context where only a few empirical studies being conducted (e.g., Fu and Heffernan, 2009; Fungáčováa et al. 2013 ).
Difference-in-Difference approach analysis
The year 2005 is considered an exogenous shock after which more radical reform measures were adopted to accelerate the privatization of state-owned banks. We therefore expect the Table 6 .
[Insert Table 6 Here]
The interaction term Post*Big 5 is negatively related to the ratio of impaired loans to The interaction term Post*Big 5 is also negatively related to the Z-score and the equity to asset ratio, indicating that the differences in bank stability and equity ratio between Big 5 and other banks also decreased after the 2005 banking reforms. These results confirm the impact of banking reform on bank outcome, as we observe reduced differences across different outcome measures between Big 5 and other more privatized banks after the banking reforms.
Conclusion
Over the past several decades, the Chinese banking sector has undergone significant reforms. The ratio of impaired loans to total assets. ln(z-score)
Logarithm of Z-score. A measure of how many standard deviations a bank is away from exhausting its capital base. A higher value indicates higher overall bank stability. It is calculated at the three-year rolling time window. Equity to assets
The ratio of bank equity to total assets Return on assets
The ratio of bank net income after tax to total assets Standard deviation of ROA The standard deviation of return on assets, calculated at the three-year rolling time window. Efficiency Efficiency score is calculated from the DEA model, with three inputs (customer deposits and short-term funding, total costs, and equity capital, to adequately account for the impact of risk) and three outputs (loans, other earning assets, and non-interest incomes Bank-specific characteristics Size The natural logarithm of total assets. Lerner
The Lerner index measuring the mark-up of price over marginal costs. The higher the value, the more market power the bank has. Diversification
The ratio of non-interest income to total operating income.
Cost to income ratio
The ratio of operating expenses over operating income. Liquidity
The ratio of the sum of cash and for-sale securities to total assets. Table 3 Correlation Matrix (1) (2) 
(1)ROA (2) The dependent variables are impaired loans to total assets ratio, logarithm of Z-score (rolling at the three-year window) and its three components, i.e., return on assets (ROA), standard deviation of ROA (rolling at three-year window) and Equity/TA ratio, and Efficiency Score. T-statistics are based on standard errors clustered at the bank level, where *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Check Table 1 for detailed definitions of variables. The dependent variables are the ratio of impaired loans to total assets, the logarithm of Z-score (rolling at three-year window) and its three components, i.e., return on assets (ROA), standard deviation of ROA (rolling at three-year window) and Equity/TA ratio, and Efficiency Score. T-statistics are based on standard errors clustered at the bank level, where *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Check Table 1 for detailed definitions of variables. 
